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Abstract. Conversation analysis (CA) is now what Kuhn once called a normal 
science. It has a discernible body of concepts, methods and recognisable objects of 
analysis. More importantly, its considerable archive of accumulated findings has a 
very high degree of redundancy — in the positive sense that researchers have 
continually replicated the findings of their colleagues. It ought, then, in every 
respect, to be the envy of the social sciences generally and not easily dismissed as 
an abstruse and recondite branch of language studies or (worse) “discourse 
analysis” concerned with merely trivial fragments of recorded talk as such. To 
help CA be respecified in this way, the present paper unearths a relatively 
unknown part of its history in the partial book manuscript of Harvey Sacks’s 
Aspects of the Sequential Organization of Conversation, circulated in mimeo to 
colleagues in 1970. There we find innumerable appeals to the now well-
recognised fact that the practical actions of everyday talk have significant, culture-
wide, formal structures that are the proper objects of the discipline. Or, in Sacks’s 
own terms, seemingly insignificant mundane events are generated by a powerful 
(if not always intuitively accessible) social “machinery”. The purpose of this paper 
is, then, to extract a sample of these aspects of Sacks’s Aspects in order to illustrate, 
sketch, or give a preliminary sense of just that point. 
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Aspects: the typescript 
 
Sadly enough, it is not possible for just anyone who happens to be interested in 
reading it to obtain a copy of the work entitled Aspects of the Sequential 
Organization of Conversation. What I believe to be the last version drafted by Sacks, 
dated September 1970, was made freely available — with characteristic generosity 
— by its author to any colleagues who inquired after it. On request, mimeos of the 
draft chapters would be mailed out. One such recipient was the human ethologist, 
Adam Kendon whom I met at the Australian National University on my arrival 
there in 1975. He let me read his mimeo copy. Indeed, he allowed me to 
photocopy it, using one of those early glossy-paper photocopiers, not known for 
the longevity of their inking. To preserve my copy against ageing, I had it bound 
(along with quite a few copies of Sacks’s lectures) in black covers and kept it well 
out of the penetrating Australian sun. It is still very clearly legible today, some 30 
years later. 
  The point of this brief history is to make it clear from the start that I will 
have most readers of this paper at something of a disadvantage. I can read and 
refer to the typescript, but my interpretations of it cannot be easily checked. In 
that respect I beg to be trusted until, hopefully, one day, a published version sees 
the light of day. Until such a time, as one of the reviewers of an earlier draft of 
this paper put it: it’s like a book review without access to the book in question. I’ll 
have to admit to that strange generic identification: what other choice is there? 
  As noted, my copy of the typescript is dated September 1970. It consists of 
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 only and runs to some 53,000 words. A title-page note reads: 
The following manuscript is a draft. It is currently being 
revised, and when revised will be published by Prentice-Hall. 
The numbered chapters are all being extensively revised and no 
part of it, as written, stands as final now. Revisions on all parts Aspects of Aspects | 3 
of it have been proceeding and it should be completed for 
publication by 1971. 
The manuscript is in two parts. This is part one. 
The absence of Chapter 1 is explained as follows: 
As of September, 1970, Chapter One has been so extensively 
revised that the current multi-copy version is omitted. The focus 
of this chapter is “Second Stories”, and some work on that may 
be seen in the Spring and Summer lectures from 1970.i 
The three extant chapters are on roughly the following topics: 
§2.  The speaker-sequential organisation of conversation. This is effectively a draft 
systematics for turn-taking, accounting as it does for “one at a time” and “speaker 
change recurs” in conversations with more than two parties. Some topics include: 
greetings and their absence (“He didn’t even say hello”); interruptions and 
ensuing complaints about them; what constitutes a “violation”. 
§3.  Hearers’ problems. Here, Sacks addresses such matters as analysing others’ 
talk for the possibility of conjoint productions; for example conjoint completions. 
The chapter deals with the general notion of completion points and, in particular, 
with hearers’ attention to “possible completions”. The units monitored or analysed 
by hearers are referred to as “sentence units”. Some topics include: introductions 
and orienting newcomers to an ongoing conversation; reference to persons as 
forms of “categorical incumbency”; everyday actions as methodical “solutions” to 
routine problems; “ultra-rich” topics (teenagers talking about cars); features of 
joint productions. 
§4.  Questions of gap and overlap. Sacks notes that gaps and overlaps are 
locatable in materials but (more importantly) they can be analysed as artefacts of 
an orientation by speakers and hearers to their orderly avoidance or 
minimisation. Particularly important in this respect are completion markers — 
such things as: post-completors (“Didn’t you hear me?”); utterance completors 
(tag questions: “isn’t it?”); utterance incompletors (sentence connectors: “but”, Aspects of Aspects | 4 
“and”, “however”); and stoppers (“Wait a minute!”). The chapter also includes 
considerations of topic and topicality in relation to completors (“I still say 
though...”) and “on topic” topic markers (“I just had a thought”).ii Following this, 
Sacks returns to the draft “systematics” of Chapter 2 in terms of “talking beyond a 
single possible sentence”. 
 
 
Speaker sequencing 
 
Here I’m interested in the extended use which Sacks makes of an approach to 
conversational sequencing via concepts such as “sentence”, “clause” and 
“utterance”. Here is an interesting example of Sacks’s use of the notion of a 
sentence from page 19 of Chapter 2: 
The sentence unit is a general structuring device for utterances. For a 
speaker sequencing system operating in an utterance by utterance 
fashion and where “utterance completion” occasions the operation 
of the speaker change technique employed in a current utterance ... 
a general problem that a speaker faces is how it is that such matters 
as “incompletion” the “upcomingness of completion” the 
“accomplishing of completion” are to be shown such that hearers 
who have found which type of selection technique has been 
employed can determine when that type of technique is to be 
employed where the timing of their use is a non-incidental feature 
of their use. It happens that the sentence as a unit can have, given 
the way that it can be attended by participants, its completion 
recognized on its completion, that it is not complete recognized by 
participants, and also; it can be monitored from its beginning to see 
from its beginning what it will take for its completion to be Aspects of Aspects | 5 
produced in such a way that on its completion its completion may 
be recognized. 
This opens up an initial suspicion about the terminology (to be explicited shortly): 
namely that we are dealing here with an earlier elaboration of such now-standard 
matters as conversational turns, turn-constructional units (TCUs) and transition-
relevance places (TRPs), but using a more traditional vocabulary for those 
phenomena. It also shows that something such as projecting completion (of, be it 
noted, specific kinds of technique  for turn transition) was critical for Sacks’s early 
solution to the “multi-party problem”. Sacks adverts to this problem throughout 
the published lectures (see especially 1992a, pp. 624-632). It runs something like 
the following: in a conversation with two parties, the sequencing of turns will be 
given by an intuitively obvious rule: if one party talks at a time, the sequence will 
be expectably A,B,A,B, etc. What then could be an equivalent rule (or, as it turned 
out, rules) for more than two parties? The “Simplest Systematics” paper (Sacks et 
al., 1974) turned out to offer the famously definitive solution to this question, 
proposing general rules for the relations between speakers, turns, turn-technique 
types, TCUs and TRPs such that not only (a) completions could be heard in 
advance by next speakers but also (b) projected turn-transition types could be 
heard in advance of such completions, so that (c) any next speaker could tell in 
advance both when to speak and also what kind of utterance to construct in next 
turn. To be sure, the 1970 terminology based on “sentences” (and the rest) by no 
means achieves this; but it does show that it is exactly this question that is on the 
agenda and that the double onus on speakers to project both transition types and 
their completion points is critical to the matter in hand. 
  While formal-linguistic terminology (“sentence”, “clause”, etc.) can be 
found in the published lectures, Aspects makes extensive use of it throughout. A 
possible explanation is the degree of formality Sacks is striving for in the book by 
comparison with the somewhat more informal lectures, intended for 
undergraduates without the necessary linguistic background.iii As we know, Aspects of Aspects | 6 
Sacks was also well aware of the contemporary Chomskian re-thinking of 
syntactic analysis and his Aspects may well have taken Chomsky’s Aspects of the 
Theory of Syntax (1965) as its — albeit contrastive — model (cf. Schgeloff’s 
Introduction to the first volume of the Lectures, especially p. xlvii). However, the 
adversion to “sentence”, “clause” and the rest may not be so curious given that 
these terms can be fairly consistently translated into the vocabulary that was to 
emerge later in the “Simplest Systematics” (Sacks et al., 1974). 
  That is, it’s possible to read Sacks’s use of the word “sentence” as (roughly) 
equivalent to “turn constructional unit” (TCU) — “roughly” because “clause” 
sometimes carries this work. We can also read his use of “utterance” as equivalent 
to “turn”. Then “possible completion (point)” becomes equivalent to “transition 
relevance place” (TRP). Read this way, Aspects clearly contains a number of 
matters central to the “Simplest Systematics” and, moreover, amplifies them in 
different and significant ways. One difference is that Sacks, at this point in his 
thinking, only registers two main types of selection technique: type one (current 
speaker selects next) and type two (next speaker self selects), thereby omitting the 
third (current speaker continues). However, the work of Section 3 of Chapter 4, 
inter alia, clearly shows that he was aware of the importance of “current 
continues” even though he appears not to want to class it as a selection technique 
as such because (by definition) it can’t select an other speaker as the next — that is, 
it can’t be used for actual cases of speaker transition, only for possible cases. 
  For example, the “current continues” question is directly dealt with in 
Section 1.1 of Chapter 4 (page 3). And by page 29 of Chapter 4, Sacks is referring 
explicitly to three numbered types of selection technique; these are: 
1. Current selects next speaker 
2. Current selects next speaker and next speaker’s action 
3. Next speaker self-selects 
However, these are discussed in the context of “multi-clause sentences”; that is, in 
terms of how current speakers can avoid types 1-3 by continuing to speak through Aspects of Aspects | 7 
possible completion points (TRPs). Of course, by the time of the “Simplest 
Systematics”, types 1 and 2 above would become a single type, with “current 
continues” added to them. Still, his remarks on the (draft) three types are 
nevertheless instructive in this respect: 
It may be true that there is a requirement of sorts to exhibit 
incompletion; which turns on the relation between (1, 2, 3) selection 
techniques. One turns to 3 where neither 1 or 2 are found. But 3 
involves neither the use of a person-selector nor an action-selector, 
and deals with, then, a situation of possible completion as 
transition adequate — it involves a location of possible completion 
which an intended, self-selected next speaker looks to use. He can 
use possible sentence completion. Not having used a possible sentence 
completion, he may use a next. The point here is this: Having rejected 
1 and 2, 3 becomes possible; but the determination of the operation 
of 3 turns only on that possible completion is involved, and not on 
any sequentially adequate action; and possible completion is in part 
a matter of sentence completion [being?] possible and that is all one 
way in which the fact of 1, 2, 3 matter[s] is that 1 is irrelevant in two 
party conversation. But there is then 2 and 3, which serve to 
occasion the other being selected, being selected for an action, and 
finding he can speak. (My emphasis) 
In this context, for me, the important but passing noticing is “Not having used a 
possible sentence completion, he may use a next”. So, even if not listed precisely 
as a type of turn construction, “current continues” is a definite consideration; 
perhaps as that completion which is not one. 
  Put shortly, Aspects may not constitute a simplest systematics but it is a 
systematics — that is a possible (draft, projected) solution to the “multi-party 
problem” — for all that. And if attention to local detail is as important as 
parsimony (which it may or may not be), there may not be every virtue in a Aspects of Aspects | 8 
systematics being the simplest possible. In any case, it is intriguing to follow Sacks 
through this earlier and original solution to the multi-party problem. 
  On the problem of clauses and sentences (and critical, then, for how we 
read many parts of Aspects), what need further investigation are the following 
matters: (a) what status does anything like a “clause” or a “sentence” have in 
conversation? (b) how do these relate to what are formally known as clauses and 
sentences in linguistics? (c) if there is a describable “turn syntax” or “sequence 
grammar”, how could we show how participants knew and used it in the 
construction of turns and transitions? It’s possible that Sacks wants to get to (c) 
before working through (a) and (b) — though this may be an artificial effect of our 
having only parts of the typescript and not the whole. 
  And while CA still debates its own putatively scientific status (cf. 
Anderson and Sharrock, 1984; Bogen, 1999; Coulter, 1983; Lynch, 1993a; Lynch, 
1993b; Lynch and Bogen, 1994), it seems reasonably clear to me that Aspects, as 
opposed for example to the much more informal Lectures, adds the value of a 
striving for a new science of human conversation, at least with respect to its 
sequencing if not in several other respects.iv The model to this point (1970) may 
be linguistics and the later solution (the “Systematics”) may be more accurate 
while turning away from that discipline; but the intention of the earlier work is 
clear: at least some aspects of human conversation are workable as scientific 
materials like any other. The point of Aspects is to try to find out how they should 
be so workable and what new method needs to be invented for their analysis. 
Sacks’s draft, I suspect, does not achieve this end. But, more than any other of his 
extant writings, it makes that intention clear as day. We can only imagine what it 
would have looked like if completed to his satisfaction. 
 
 
Repair and correction 
 Aspects of Aspects | 9 
How was Sacks considering matters of repair and correction at this time? Section 
5 of Chapter 2 of Aspects reworks material from Lecture 4 in Part I of the second 
volume of the Lectures (Fall 1968; see Sacks, 1992b, pp. 44-55). This section of the 
book is on complaints, and on the general sequencing structures that complaints 
are an instance of. This strongly prefigures the notion of “initiation of correction” 
and its sequential placement as per the “Preference for Self-correction” paper 
(Schegloff et al., 1977). That is, the particular sequence “Interruption –> 
Complaint –> Apology” can be read as a specific instance of the more general 
TROUBLE-SOURCE –> INITIATION –> CORRECTION model. And Sacks, at various 
places in Section 5 of Chapter 2, argues for a generalisability of this kind (and 
perhaps even for a generalisability of a wider sort). For example, on page 39, he 
contends that: 
Now it will turn out that the placing of an enormous number of 
things works in just that way; that the placing locates which 
prior utterances are being dealt with; not only for complaints 
but for many other things. (My emphasis) 
In some ways, this is typical of the hints that Aspects offers. We are never quite 
told what the “many other things” happen to be and are left to speculate (in this 
case, in the light of a later, more developed analysis). A “complaint” may be 
preceded by an “interruption” and followed by an “apology”. One party 
“interrupts”, the next “complains” (about the interruption) and then the original 
party “apologises” for it. Again we should refer to Sacks himself for the basic 
“flavour” of this sort of sequence (Chapter 2, page 40): 
Complaining starts a sequence. Just as it is the case for complaints 
that they do not need to locate what it is that they are complaining 
about, i.e., they do not need to say what to look to to find whether a 
complainable occurred, so the same goes for the various things that 
can follow a complaint. That is to say, if one offers an apology like 
“I’m sorry”, or an excuse, or a denial, then those are heard as Aspects of Aspects | 10 
apologies, excuses, or denials, for that complaint. And they 
furthermore exhibit that one saw the statement “You interrupted 
me” as a complaint, and saw furthermore that it was, e.g., “well 
taken”. That is to say, [one] saw not merely that this was a 
complaint when one did one’s apology, but saw also that it was a 
complaint about this utterance, and that this utterance was a 
complainable. 
What Sacks is looking for here is the nature of a “complainable” — what was later 
to be considered as one example of a “trouble source”. And the interesting thing 
about this is not so much its “content” as its sequential placing. It may be taking 
the matter too far, but there is a strong suspicion here, and indeed throughout 
Aspects, that Sacks may have been trying to develop a theory of meaning along 
roughly Wittgensteinian lines: to the effect that meaning is a question of how some 
utterance is done — and especially with regard to its sequential placement in a 
series of utterances — rather than of what its contents may be considered as 
referring to. This conjecture is somewhat supported by another point that Sacks 
makes in Chapter 4. 
  Pages 31-33 of this chapter, that is, contain an interesting variation on the 
idea of correction by comparison with the “Preference for Self-correction” paper. 
Here, Sacks announces that (what he is calling) corrections do not have to have a 
“trouble source” as such, something that is “wrong”. Such a view he calls 
“backwards looking”. Instead, he argues for a kind of correction that is “forward 
looking”. As we have noted, the version in the “Preference” paper works with the 
triad: TROUBLE-SOURCE –> INITIATION –> CORRECTION. In Sacks’s earlier version, 
the first component need not be present; it can be null. Hence the data fragment, 
below, does not constitute a “repair” in the sense intended in the “Preference” 
paper. What Sacks is commenting on, instead, is how a “self-correction”, in this 
instance, can re-shape the turn it falls in so that the speaker can proceed to Aspects of Aspects | 11 
produce a multi-clause sentence. Let us look at Sacks’s argument in more detail. 
The data fragment in question runs as follows: 
 
  (1)  A:  Didje have a nice time? 
  (2)  B:  Oh, wonderful. 
  (3)  A:  Goo::d, 
  (4)  A:  Good. 
          [[ 
  (5)  B:  Just wonder//ful. 
  (6)  A:  Where'dju go::. 
        (0.6) 
  (7)  B:  We were in northern California, up– (0.2) 
      weh(hhh)– (0.4) way up in the mountains too. 
        (0.4) 
  (8)  A:  Oh well we wen' up there oh:: about thr– 'hh 
      I'd say about three weeks ago we was up at 
      Maripo:sa, 'hh//hhhh 
  (9)  B:  Uh huh, 
  (10)  A:  –an' up in the Mother Lode country en we wen' 
      all through those ghost tow:ns. 
 
The focal point for Sacks is the utterance labelled (8) which contains a self-
correction by speaker A. And yet, according to Sacks’s analysis, what that 
correction generates is not merely a replacement for a correctable utterance, but a 
further, new utterance  (“sentence”) in its own right: 
It may be first noted that in the course of that utterance [8], in the 
course of its first sentence, a correction is engaged in. It may be 
second noted that the product of the correction operation involves 
what turns out to be the production of a new, a second sentence.... 
[T]he new, the second sentence does not stand to the first as some 
corrections do; i.e., as simply a replacement sentence, but it is in 
some ways a quite genuine second sentence in the sense that it 
quite differs from what the first has already successfully asserted. 
That is, it does not correct the first’s available assertion about 
having been in Northern California, but adds that, at the time that 
was in the course of being mentioned when the correction is done Aspects of Aspects | 12 
— three weeks ago — the particular places(s) in Northern 
California they were in was (first) Mariposa. It is then a specifying 
sentence, specifying what the first proposed, and what it did 
propose though it was not completed, and not just replacing it. 
Finally, let us note, fourth, that there is nothing wrong with the 
sentence that gets corrected, and that the way it is proceeding can 
readily involve its being brought to a natural grammatical 
conclusion, i.e., “. . . about three weeks ago . . .” period. 
In short, what gives the correction its quality as a correction — or, we might say, 
how it comes to have the meaning of being a correction — is not so much a matter 
of its content. In this case, it is not that it has content which replaces the originally 
projected utterance by virtue of some trouble that can be heard with that original 
utterance. In fact, there is no “trouble” as such and no replacement; instead there 
is an amplification or “specification”. Consequently, the utterance’s status as a 
correction is given purely by its sequential placement. 
  Sacks’s commentary on methodology, immediately following this analysis 
(Chapter 4, page 32), may then be pertinent. It is one of the most succinct versions 
of his approach at this time: 
Let it be emphatically noted that in asking this question [“Why 
do a correction?”] we are again as elsewhere throughout this 
volume, not asking a question of the form: which, of the reasons 
we know of, that anyone knows of, for doing a correction, is the 
reason here? Our problem is: What would be an answer to the 
question, why was a correction done? And in this regard we 
shall again find that the answer we have specifically built to 
deal with this piece of data, while it may have some sort of 
intuitive appeal to it, will not have that sort of intuitive appeal 
which involves our recognition that the explanation is one that Aspects of Aspects | 13 
we are at home with — that we know that that is a reason why 
people do things, so it may be the reason here. 
This repeats the methodological point made over and again by Sacks: the analysis 
of the machinery for the production of some event must be just as plausible as the 
event itself, though it may be counter-intuitive (in the sense of things “that we are at 
home with”) — even if, at the end of the day, “it may have some sort of intuitive 
appeal”, as it were, of its own. The machinery, that is, will indeed generate how 
“we know that that is a reason why people do things”, but only as a by-product. 
So this — “that we [commonsensically] know that that is a reason why people do 
things” — is not a suitably “scientific” account. It merely re-runs the machinery 
another time, amongst many possible times. So it cannot, by definition, explicate 
the machinery. Sacks’s project, then, is to find another way of explicating the 
machinery, one that must generate massively repeated everyday events such as, in 
the present case, hearable corrections. And this much is consistent with Sacks’s 
view of cultures as exhibiting “order at all points”. If the machinery, as such, must 
do so (that is, generate massively repeated everyday events), then it “may have 
some sort of intuitive appeal” — but that would be merely incidental to its 
analytic veracity. 
  Instead, the “order at all points” assumption underpinning Sacks’s 
thinking at the time suggests a completely different methodology for 
investigating social practice and social order and the above analysis of a 
correction without a correctable (trouble-source) is a good case in point. Schegloff, 
in his Introduction to the first volume of the Lectures (1992a, p. xlvi), puts the 
position as follows: 
This view [order at all points], rather like the “holographic” model 
of information distribution, understands order not to be present 
only at aggregate levels and therefore subject to an overall 
differential distribution, but to be present in detail on a case by 
case, environment by environment basis. A culture is not then to be Aspects of Aspects | 14 
found only by aggregating all of its venues; it is substantially 
present in each of its venues. 
A question, then, like “Why do a correction?” may indeed have an intuitive 
answer: we do corrections in order to replace something that has gone wrong in a 
prior utterance or utterance part. A single instance of (or “venue” for) a correction 
being done in some other way shows us that a more general aspect of social 
ordering is operating — and provably so in the sense of being answerable to 
specific materials — but one which turns out to be quite contrary to our intuition 
about such things. A similar case in point is Sacks’s observations on the relations 
between topical and sequential organisation in ordinary talk. I will turn briefly to 
this matter before returning to the question of what sort of thing a conversational 
“machinery” might look like. 
 
 
Topical-, referential- and sequential-organisation 
 
Another interesting aspect of Aspects, then, is Sacks’s account of the relations 
between topic organisation and sequential organisation. The following passage 
from Chapter 4 (page 41) is of particular note: 
Perhaps the core task for the examination of topical 
organization as an order of organization is to find means for 
seeing that topical organization for talk is a sort of sequential 
organization for talkers that operates in some considerable 
independence of what topic is being talked of. (My emphasis) 
The point is — and this is further evidence of Sacks’s analytic “holism” — that 
matters of topic can’t easily be dealt with separately from matters of sequentiality. 
Topic is not, as we might imagine or intuit, a question of mere “content” so much 
as of sequential organisation itself. Again, we see the analytic and methodological 
consequences of (again, roughly) a kind of Wittgensteinian approach to meaning. Aspects of Aspects | 15 
Intuitively, we might consider conversational meaning to be a function of the 
kinds of reference its topics are able to achieve; and sequencing to be a merely 
secondary matter to that; as a linear series of “slots” into which semantically-
loaded “fillers” can be inserted. Sacks wants to show otherwise: that how talk gets 
done as a form of sequential ordering is the key to what people “mean” when 
they talk. 
  In Chapter 3 (page 50), Sacks also makes it clear that he does not necessarily 
separate out sequencing analysis from “reference analysis” — as in “reference to 
persons”, hence what later came to be called “membership categorisation 
analysis”. He is discussing the Group Therapy Session fragment that involves 
some insults and return insults (“Ken, face it, you’re a poor little rich kid”; “Yes 
Mommy”). The analysis turns on Roger referring to Ken via the category 
“Mommy”. On any referentialist account, the selection of the identification 
“Mommy” for Ken (by Roger) is simply false: Ken is quite simply not Roger’s 
mother and that must be the end of the analysis. However, if we take a 
sequentialist position instead, the meaning of “Yes Mommy” becomes clearer. 
A specific alternative to [the referentialist] possibility would be: 
The first task in interpreting an utterance is to use some means to 
determine what sequentially it is doing; if what it is sequentially 
doing can yield whom it might be addressing, then the terms used 
might be examined to find what is being asserted about the person 
it is addressing given the term used to do that assertion. If, that is, 
there were means available for finding what by reference to such 
facts as (a) who was talking and (b) how did he come to be talking 
as locating a possible action he might be doing, then those 
employed first might yield a candidate addressee, who when then 
found, could be examined for what the addressing term would be 
used to be doing to them. Aspects of Aspects | 16 
We must take it then that things such as insults are sequentially paired; they are 
formed as INSULT –> RETURN-INSULT. And one way to do the second of these is 
what Sacks calls “intentional mis-identification”. Under such a view, “Yes 
Mommy” becomes perfectly acceptable as something other than merely a false 
identification. Hence, Sacks’s conclusion concerning this “intentional mis-
identification” is: “Since such materials as these are familiar, it can be then said 
that at least sometimes reference succeeds and does not precede sequencing 
determinations” (my emphasis). He goes on: 
The foregoing discussion does not of course tell us that [...] 
sequencing analysis precedes other things than reference 
analysis; it deals with the relative use of these sorts of analysis, 
in some instances of their mutual evidence. 
That is, finding the referential relevance of the category “Mommy” (for Roger) 
cannot be completely distinct from its turn-sequential relevance in an INSULT –> 
RETURN-INSULT pair. This lends some (if not conclusive) support to the idea that 
Sacks never seriously thought of the analysis of “reference to persons” (that is, 
what would become membership categorisation analysis) as somehow separate 
from CA generally. Clearly, at least in this instance, reference to persons makes no 
sense without first inspecting sequencing considerations. And, as we have seen, 
Sacks appeared to want to generalise from the fragment in question; to find the 
more general social machinery that could have generated any such instance. Why 
is this “machinery” important? 
 
 
The power of the machineryv 
 
In several parts of Aspects, Sacks remarks on the “power of the machinery” and 
the relations between its orientational rules (such as “only one party talks at a 
time”) and questions of “public law”. Just after the middle of Chapter 2, for Aspects of Aspects | 17 
example, there is an extended discussion of how private matters (roughly: 
speakers’ in situ interests) are hooked up with public rule mechanisms (in which, 
Sacks says, no one could be personally interested). He puts the problem this way 
(page 45): 
How is it that matters are arranged so that people have an 
interest, concern, with some sorts of rules that in any particular 
case may be uninteresting for the particular scene, but which 
[need] in some way to be generally operative; and which 
[require] that the local participants have to have it as their 
business to do the enforcing, if [they are] going to be enforced.vi 
So, in cases of more than one party talking at a time (page 46): 
the occurrence of more than one talking at a time can turn out 
to be an observable violation of the current speaker’s right to 
speak to completion. And the current speaker can then be 
mobilized to see that some right of his has been violated. And 
if a current speaker is built in the right way, then he can get 
aroused at somebody dealing wrongly with his property — his 
property being that space in the conversation in which he is 
now talking . 
Significantly perhaps, Sacks then finds a connection between such public 
conversational rules and classical sociological (Weberian) accounts of how private 
interests can be invoked to maintain public rules (pages 46-47).vii 
Max Weber regularly says things like: The big problem for any 
society is that there are some more or less generalized 
organizational techniques which it sets up, and which people 
need to be mobilized to behavior in the interests of; but (and in 
this I’m not clear whether it is one or the other of the following 
alternatives) either Weber thinks you cannot mobilize people 
unless you mobilize them about private interests, or it’s that he Aspects of Aspects | 18 
says that societies “know” that they cannot organize people 
unless they organize them about private interests. And so some 
kind of techniques are found whereby private interests are 
fitted into “public requirements”. And [this is] a theme that 
occurs again and again in Weber, for example in his incredible 
paper “Politics as a Vocation”, where he locates the political 
boss as that sort of person who is able to monitor the range of 
private interests and use them and interest in them to engage in 
some sorts of public action. He makes a case for the ethical 
disinterest of the political boss and thereby assimilates him to 
the priest who is engaged in the same sort of task; of monitoring 
the relationship between an ethic and anybody’s ethics. (My 
emphasis) 
Note also that Sacks shows how emotions can be organised around such public 
rules (page 48). 
What we get apparently, is that the general features are 
transformed into local private rights which are affiliated to 
anybody by virtue of the fact that they “just happen to be 
talking now”. And emotions are apparently organized around 
those in very strong ways; so that e.g., in the case of 
interruption, people will become utterly outraged, livid, over 
the occurrence of an interruption, in a way that is presumably 
no weaker than the outrage they could feel about any other of 
their “private rights”. Now that type of operation gains the 
extensiveness of its power by reference to a series of things that are 
done with the occurrence of an interruption. What happens is 
that if somebody does an interruption to some other, then the 
other need not deal with it — though there is the rule about 
interruptions which provides that they should not be done. — It Aspects of Aspects | 19 
is not dealt with simply as an “interruption”, preserved 
historically as an “interruption”; it is assimilated to a class 
consisting of a bunch of other things “like it”. And the 
organization of that class involves something like, each of its 
cases can — almost like a bunch of kids trying to deal with a 
bully — give each other case support. (My emphasis) 
Note the phrase: “the extensiveness of its power” applied to this aspect of the 
conversational machinery: the “type of operation” whereby public rules are made 
to work at the level of private rights. Indeed, elsewhere Sacks refers to the 
machinery as “finely powerful” and a variety of similar expressions.viii And 
Schgeloff, too, in his Introduction to the second volume of the Lectures (1992b, p. 
xlvii) puts this both very elegantly and with some resonances for the argument of 
the present paper: 
The power of this analytic tool is potentially very extensive, and 
some of it made its way into the eventually published version in 
the turn-taking paper .... More work along these lines was planned; 
perhaps some day more will appear, however impoverished by 
Sacks’ unavailability to press it ahead in his own distinctive way. 
Taking up this never-completely formulated idea of “power”: in the literature 
comparing Sacks with classical sociology (for example, Silverman, 1998, p. 59), it 
is well known that Sacks eschews any classical sociological concept of “power”. 
There’s just a possibility, however, that, in Aspects, Sacks is not eschewing but 
fundamentally reconstructing the classical conception of power in terms of the 
power of the “machinery”. In Aspects, the machinery, that is, is characterised as 
both extensively and finely powerful. A possible inference is: for everyday life (and 
the machinery for its being done), what is “fine” is also “extensive” — and vice 
versa. It is “fine” in its locality and specificity; it does “just this” for “just these” 
local purposes and interests. It is “extensive”, however, by virtue of any particular Aspects of Aspects | 20 
technique (like “interrupting”) being publicly normative, in the sense that “it is 
assimilated to a class consisting of a bunch of other things ‘like it’” (page 48). 
  This would be the ultimate argument against the “so what?” (or “triviality 
of the data”) question; and against the putative “micro-macro” distinction. The 
machinery that generates the supposedly “trivial” data (the minutiae of everyday 
conduct) is both extensively and finely powerful — where “the machinery” is what 
people have to know-and-use in order to know-and-use what they manifestly can 
be analytically proven to know-and-use in the conduct of their everyday affairs. 
And then CA would be any rigorous attempt to uncover that machinery from the 
materials at hand.  Aspects of Aspects | 21 
 
Notes 
i.  Following a presentation of an earlier version of this paper at the “Orders of 
Ordinary Action” Conference (Manchester 2001), Russell Kelly was kind 
enough to provide me with an undated photocopy of Chapter One. It is 
entitled “Second Stories” and partially overlaps some of the matters raised in 
the Spring 1970 lecture series (Sacks, 1992b, pp. 222-268) as well as Lectures 1 
and 2 from the Fall 1968 series (Sacks, 1992b, pp. 3-31) and the April 24 lecture 
from Spring 1968 (Sacks, 1992a, pp. 764-772). There are no “Summer lectures 
from 1970” in the published edition of Sacks’s Lectures. 
ii.  An interesting footnote on p. 15 of this chapter considers laughing, and 
prefigures later published papers (Sacks, 1974; 1978; Jefferson et al., 1987). It 
reads: 
Laughing is of particular interest not only for reasons mentioned 
earlier, that it is a thing for which timing is particularly relevant (cf 
GTS:2:16 which should be used for the delayed reaction point being 
made), but also because laughing is one quite special sort of thing 
in this way: It is a sort of sequentially relevant object that 
specifically does not have it that it should be done in a one at a time 
way as a feature of it. Not merely is it okay that it be done with 
more than one doing it at a time, but to have it done one at a time 
involves that for each it will not be seen that one waited until the 
other was finished laughing to start, but one’s start will be seen as 
locating when it is that one caught the joke. One should laugh Aspects of Aspects | 22 
 
when one catches the joke in independence of that someone else is 
laughing now; and indeed one may appropriately laugh before the 
joke teller has stopped talking, if one can see the joke before it has 
been finished. 
iii.  One possibility that intrigues me about Aspects is the following. Throughout 
the Lectures, Sacks makes constant reference to the “work” he is currently 
doing. Sometimes the reference is to what would later turn out to be 
recognised publications. But, as often as not, the reference is to topics that are 
central to Aspects. Is it possible, then, that the book is the “work” that Sacks is 
speaking about to his students? 
iv.  On the first reading of this paper in Manchester, the “added value” question 
was put to me by Rod Watson with characteristic and continuing collegiality. 
It has taken me several years of thinking to be able to reply to it. Even now — 
so excellent are Rod’s questions — I’m not completely sure about the 
response. One does one’s best! 
v .  It should be noted that most of the analytic material from Aspects dealt with in 
this section is taken almost verbatim from the the second volume of the 
Lectures (or possibly vice versa). See in particular (Sacks, 1992b, pp. 50-51). 
What interests me most about this overlap of texts is that Sacks chose these 
particular connections to provide focal points, in his only proposedly 
published book. His contribution to the configuration of the social sciences 
generally was clearly important to him. 
vi.  The typescript has: “needs”, “requires” and “it is”. Aspects of Aspects | 23 
 
vii.  In another formulation (Chapter 4, pages 8-9), Sacks puts it as follows: 
Mobilizing the interests of other parties in one’s success at 
achieving completion in the silence of all others and in having the 
sequential implicativeness of one’s utterance operate, serves as an 
important constraint on the talk that one does in conversation. For 
one then may need to talk in such a way as to have the others’ such 
interests mobilized. And if one can so talk then we can see how 
such an interest can operate to keep people talking to what matters 
for not merely themselves but [also for] the others that they are 
talking with. Again all of this turns on the fact that the public law 
of conversation may not suffice to have its public rules enforced, 
and, that it may not suffice can then turn out to be relevant for the 
sort of talk that participants then do, which means then that the 
insufficiency of the public law to have its intended features 
operative is relevant for keeping participants in some actual 
conversation doing the talk that not only mobilizes interests of 
other parties, but in then doing talk which will involve not merely 
that the other parties are silent during that talk but also will talk on 
its completion, and will do talk on its completion that will in turn 
get others to talk on their completion. Then the weakness of the 
public law is a resource for actual conversations. 
viii. In Chapter 2, for example, Sacks writes (pages 52-53): Aspects of Aspects | 24 
 
So we have really enormously elaborate, and apparently also 
powerful — if not over-powerful — sets of regulations that are 
operative about the classes for which “interrupting” is a case, fitted 
onto the private rights of any speaker to speak until completion, 
fitted onto the general feature “exactly one party talks at a time”. 
And of course, the same enforcement structure will be operative for 
a series of other features, fitted to other mechanisms or required 
parts of this general structure. When we ask — as we might 
reasonably ask — “Why in the world is such a big deal made of 
that somebody interrupts someone; why are there these enormous 
operative machines ready to engage in working on such a fact?” 
what we have done is to mis-concretize the phenomenon. That is to 
say, we have asked “Why is it such a big deal about that somebody 
interrupted someone?” What we have is a mechanism designed to 
get at the general way of preserving whole classes of things, for 
anybody; where the preservation of “one party at a time” in 
conversation in general is of great import; that is to say, the 
communication system turns on it in many many ways. (My 
emphasis) Aspects of Aspects | 25 
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